With apologies to my police officer friends, family members, and clients, a funny, informative, persuasive lecture with one message: you should never, under any circumstances, talk to the police.
25 April 2012
AD4: HGN AOK
People v Julius, 2012 NY Slip Op 02198 [4th Dept 2012] [available here]
The Fourth Department has fallen in line with the Second and Third Departments, holding that a trial court may allow a police officer to testify "regarding a horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test (HGN test)without conducting a Frye hearing." What is the HGN test? Take it away, Youtube:
The Court notes that "HGN tests have been found to be accepted within the scientific community as a reliable indicator of intoxication and, thus, a court may take judicial notice of the HGN test's acceptability." The proper foundation for the testimony must still be laid by the officer, including his qualifications and training to administer the test and "the techniques he employed."
The Julius decision makes it more difficult for DWI defendants in Rochester and the surrounding counties in the Fourth Department to challenge the admissibility of HGN tests. The main attack point shifts from the nature and reliability of the HGN test itself, to whether the officer was adequately trained and followed the proper steps in administering the test.
Of course, be careful what you say while performing the roadside tests, as demonstrated by the motorist in the clip below:
The Fourth Department has fallen in line with the Second and Third Departments, holding that a trial court may allow a police officer to testify "regarding a horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test (HGN test)without conducting a Frye hearing." What is the HGN test? Take it away, Youtube:
The Court notes that "HGN tests have been found to be accepted within the scientific community as a reliable indicator of intoxication and, thus, a court may take judicial notice of the HGN test's acceptability." The proper foundation for the testimony must still be laid by the officer, including his qualifications and training to administer the test and "the techniques he employed."
The Julius decision makes it more difficult for DWI defendants in Rochester and the surrounding counties in the Fourth Department to challenge the admissibility of HGN tests. The main attack point shifts from the nature and reliability of the HGN test itself, to whether the officer was adequately trained and followed the proper steps in administering the test.
Of course, be careful what you say while performing the roadside tests, as demonstrated by the motorist in the clip below:
12 April 2012
Redefining ineffective assistance of counsel
People v Fisher, 2012 NY Slip Op 02416 [2012]
A defendant in a criminal case has the right to a lawyer. And not just a potted plant in a suit; an effective lawyer. A defendant's rights would mean little without a competent attorney on board to make sure that the rights guaranteed by the United States and New York Constitutions are not violated.
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the bar is set pretty low for defense attorneys. Courts reviewing a lawyer's performance chalk up all manner of mistake to trial strategy, or acknowledge mistakes but find enough moments of competent representation to disregard the bad moments.
But there are signs that, at least in New York, the standard is changing. The latest, clearest marker of that trend is People v Fisher, handed down last week by the Court of Appeals. The defendant in Fisher faced some pretty awful accusations that he sexually molested two of his nieces. But there were plenty of problems with the prosecution's case at trial. The mother of the alleged victims had a pretty strong financial motive to fabricate the allegations, and one of the main witnesses against Fisher was a jail-house snitch, a convicted murderer who bartered his testimony against Fisher in exchange for a favorable recommendation from the prosecutor to the parole board.
The prosecutor in Fisher gave a fairly typical closing argument in a child sex abuse case. She argued that the child had gone down a "long road" to testify at the trial, that the child had repeated her story multiple times to all sorts of people, and the story was consistent each time. One problem: there was no actual evidence before the jury that the child had made prior consistent statements, and any such evidence would have been inadmissible bolstering. The prosecutor went on to minimize the benefit the DA's office conferred on the snitch for testifying, an argument that the Court of Appeals found "less than frank" and "materially misleading." The prosecutor closed with the by-now standard line: "the day that the voice of the child is not evidence is the day that those doors [the doors to the courtroom] should be locked forever." The Court of Appeals noted that "it was not permissible for the prosecutor, an officer of the court, to admonish the jury that their acceptance of the testimony of the child witnesses was essential to the administration of justice."
What is amazing about this decision is that the Court of Appeals did not reverse the defendant's conviction based on the prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument. Indeed, the Court was without any authority to reverse on that ground, because defense counsel at trial let the prosecutor's closing argument flow by without objection. And that is precisely why the Court of Appeals did reverse the conviction. The Court held "defense counsel's failure to object to any, let alone all, of the prosecutor's egregiously improper departures during summation, particularly in the highly charged, potentially outcome determinative context in which they occurred, deprived defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel."
This a doubly surprising result: appellate courts almost never reverse based on a prosecutor's misconduct, and a reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is rarer still. The precedent is comprehensively laid out in Judge Smith's blistering dissent. To have a reversal, from the highest court in New York, based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, is sort of mind-blowing.
The Fisher decision will change the way the Monroe County District Attorney's office prosecutes child sex abuse cases. They basically have to throw out their script and start over and try to obtain a conviction the old-fashioned way: by relying on the facts and evidence of the case, and not improper emotional pleas to the jury. Beyond that, Fisher should change the way defense lawyers practice. A lot of lawyers are taught, as a matter of strategy and courtesy, to let closing argument pass without objection unless the prosecutor does something truly outrageous. That conduct is now, according to the highest court in the state, the mark of an incompetent lawyer.
Beyond the context of closing argument, the Fisher decision could provide defendants another avenue for review on appeal. All too often, the intermediate appellate courts will refuse to reach issues that are not properly preserved for appeal by trial defense counsel. The Fisher decision gives appellate counsel the ability to argue, essentially, in the alternative: issue A should result in reversal, but if the Court finds issue A un-preserved, reversal is still required because trial defense counsel's failure to preserve the issue deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
Kudos to Jan Somes, a friend and member of the excellent appeals bureau of the Monroe County Public Defender's Office, on the brief for Mr. Fisher before the high court.
A defendant in a criminal case has the right to a lawyer. And not just a potted plant in a suit; an effective lawyer. A defendant's rights would mean little without a competent attorney on board to make sure that the rights guaranteed by the United States and New York Constitutions are not violated.
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the bar is set pretty low for defense attorneys. Courts reviewing a lawyer's performance chalk up all manner of mistake to trial strategy, or acknowledge mistakes but find enough moments of competent representation to disregard the bad moments.
But there are signs that, at least in New York, the standard is changing. The latest, clearest marker of that trend is People v Fisher, handed down last week by the Court of Appeals. The defendant in Fisher faced some pretty awful accusations that he sexually molested two of his nieces. But there were plenty of problems with the prosecution's case at trial. The mother of the alleged victims had a pretty strong financial motive to fabricate the allegations, and one of the main witnesses against Fisher was a jail-house snitch, a convicted murderer who bartered his testimony against Fisher in exchange for a favorable recommendation from the prosecutor to the parole board.
The prosecutor in Fisher gave a fairly typical closing argument in a child sex abuse case. She argued that the child had gone down a "long road" to testify at the trial, that the child had repeated her story multiple times to all sorts of people, and the story was consistent each time. One problem: there was no actual evidence before the jury that the child had made prior consistent statements, and any such evidence would have been inadmissible bolstering. The prosecutor went on to minimize the benefit the DA's office conferred on the snitch for testifying, an argument that the Court of Appeals found "less than frank" and "materially misleading." The prosecutor closed with the by-now standard line: "the day that the voice of the child is not evidence is the day that those doors [the doors to the courtroom] should be locked forever." The Court of Appeals noted that "it was not permissible for the prosecutor, an officer of the court, to admonish the jury that their acceptance of the testimony of the child witnesses was essential to the administration of justice."
What is amazing about this decision is that the Court of Appeals did not reverse the defendant's conviction based on the prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument. Indeed, the Court was without any authority to reverse on that ground, because defense counsel at trial let the prosecutor's closing argument flow by without objection. And that is precisely why the Court of Appeals did reverse the conviction. The Court held "defense counsel's failure to object to any, let alone all, of the prosecutor's egregiously improper departures during summation, particularly in the highly charged, potentially outcome determinative context in which they occurred, deprived defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel."
This a doubly surprising result: appellate courts almost never reverse based on a prosecutor's misconduct, and a reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is rarer still. The precedent is comprehensively laid out in Judge Smith's blistering dissent. To have a reversal, from the highest court in New York, based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, is sort of mind-blowing.
The Fisher decision will change the way the Monroe County District Attorney's office prosecutes child sex abuse cases. They basically have to throw out their script and start over and try to obtain a conviction the old-fashioned way: by relying on the facts and evidence of the case, and not improper emotional pleas to the jury. Beyond that, Fisher should change the way defense lawyers practice. A lot of lawyers are taught, as a matter of strategy and courtesy, to let closing argument pass without objection unless the prosecutor does something truly outrageous. That conduct is now, according to the highest court in the state, the mark of an incompetent lawyer.
Beyond the context of closing argument, the Fisher decision could provide defendants another avenue for review on appeal. All too often, the intermediate appellate courts will refuse to reach issues that are not properly preserved for appeal by trial defense counsel. The Fisher decision gives appellate counsel the ability to argue, essentially, in the alternative: issue A should result in reversal, but if the Court finds issue A un-preserved, reversal is still required because trial defense counsel's failure to preserve the issue deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
Kudos to Jan Somes, a friend and member of the excellent appeals bureau of the Monroe County Public Defender's Office, on the brief for Mr. Fisher before the high court.
30 March 2012
Happy Friday (ignoring the right to remain silent)
Sadly, this guy was arrested and charged with intentional murder for the un-counseled statements made at 1:36.
21 March 2012
Cops may not use Taser to obtain DNA sample
People v Smith, 2012 NY Slip Op 01896 (4th Dept 2012) (available here)
Prosecutors in Niagara received a hit from the state DNA database that indicated Ryan Smith's DNA matched DNA collected from the scene of some home invasion robberies in Niagara Falls, New York. The prosecutor asked the Court to order Smith to provide a DNA sample to confirm the hit from the state database, and provided Smith notice of the application and an opportunity to be heard in opposition. Smith did not respond to the motion, the Court granted the order, and Smith gave a DNA sample as required by the Court.
Then the cops sent the DNA sample "to the incorrect lab" and the sample was compromised.
So the prosecutor went back to Court (hat in hand, presumably, if the ADAs in Niagara County still wear hats these days), and asked the Court to sign another Order forcing Smith to give another DNA sample. This time, Smith was not provided any notice of the application, and was given no opportunity to be heard in opposition. The judge signed the Order anyway.
New order in hand, the police caught up to Smith on the street in Buffalo. Two officers put Smith into the back of a police cruiser and took him back to the police station. Once at the station, "defendant was placed in a secure room, where he was handcuffed, seated on the floor, and surrounded by three patrol officers and two detectives." When asked to open his mouth so the police could swab his cheek for DNA, Smith refused.
Although the decision from the Fourth Department does not mention it, Smith did a little more than refuse. His exact words were, "You are gonna have to Taser me if you want my DNA." (Hat Tip: Simple Justice, by way of New York Criminal Defense.) To which the cops responded: why didn't we think of that? The officers tased Smith until he opened his mouth and gave the sample.
The trial court refused to suppress the DNA evidence, finding both that it was 1) completely kosher that the second Order compelling Mr. Smith to submit his DNA was obtained without any notice to Smith, and 2) that the police did not use excessive force to obtain the sample.
The Fourth Department, in a thoughtful and strong opinion from Justice Erin Peradotto, disagreed on both scores. On the notice issue, the Court had little trouble holding "it does not elevate form over substance with respect to defendant's due process rights to require the People to provide notice to an uncharged suspect each and every time they seek authorization to invade the individual's body in search of evidence of guilt." Or, waiving your right to object to the invasion of your body for evidence collection one time does not open the door to invasive police conduct in perpetuity.
The Court went on to hold that the use of the taser was "objectively unreasonably under the circumstances," noting:
Congrats to Mark Funk, on the brief for Mr. Smith at the Fourth Department. Mark actually attached a CD of the video of the tasing to his brief (hat tip, again, the Mr. Shiffrin at New York Criminal Defense), and Justice Peradotto noted in the decision that the Court reviewed the video and used it to rebut the People's argument that, you know, getting shocked with a taser isn't so bad in the grand scheme of things.
Prosecutors in Niagara received a hit from the state DNA database that indicated Ryan Smith's DNA matched DNA collected from the scene of some home invasion robberies in Niagara Falls, New York. The prosecutor asked the Court to order Smith to provide a DNA sample to confirm the hit from the state database, and provided Smith notice of the application and an opportunity to be heard in opposition. Smith did not respond to the motion, the Court granted the order, and Smith gave a DNA sample as required by the Court.
Then the cops sent the DNA sample "to the incorrect lab" and the sample was compromised.
So the prosecutor went back to Court (hat in hand, presumably, if the ADAs in Niagara County still wear hats these days), and asked the Court to sign another Order forcing Smith to give another DNA sample. This time, Smith was not provided any notice of the application, and was given no opportunity to be heard in opposition. The judge signed the Order anyway.
New order in hand, the police caught up to Smith on the street in Buffalo. Two officers put Smith into the back of a police cruiser and took him back to the police station. Once at the station, "defendant was placed in a secure room, where he was handcuffed, seated on the floor, and surrounded by three patrol officers and two detectives." When asked to open his mouth so the police could swab his cheek for DNA, Smith refused.
Although the decision from the Fourth Department does not mention it, Smith did a little more than refuse. His exact words were, "You are gonna have to Taser me if you want my DNA." (Hat Tip: Simple Justice, by way of New York Criminal Defense.) To which the cops responded: why didn't we think of that? The officers tased Smith until he opened his mouth and gave the sample.
The trial court refused to suppress the DNA evidence, finding both that it was 1) completely kosher that the second Order compelling Mr. Smith to submit his DNA was obtained without any notice to Smith, and 2) that the police did not use excessive force to obtain the sample.
The Fourth Department, in a thoughtful and strong opinion from Justice Erin Peradotto, disagreed on both scores. On the notice issue, the Court had little trouble holding "it does not elevate form over substance with respect to defendant's due process rights to require the People to provide notice to an uncharged suspect each and every time they seek authorization to invade the individual's body in search of evidence of guilt." Or, waiving your right to object to the invasion of your body for evidence collection one time does not open the door to invasive police conduct in perpetuity.
The Court went on to hold that the use of the taser was "objectively unreasonably under the circumstances," noting:
the record reflects that defendant refused to open his mouth for, at most, 10 to 15 minutes before the police used the taser to force him to do so. Defendant was picked up by the police at approximatley 6:00 p.m., and was tased at 6:18 p.m. During the intervening time, the police drove defendant to the police station, consulted with their superiors, and decided to utilize the taser. We cannot agree with the suppression court that, after 10 to 15 minutes of asking a suspect to comply with a court-order baccal swab of which the suspect had no prior knowledge, it is reasonable for the police to tase a nonviolent, handcuffed, and secured defendant in order to force the suspect into submission.
Congrats to Mark Funk, on the brief for Mr. Smith at the Fourth Department. Mark actually attached a CD of the video of the tasing to his brief (hat tip, again, the Mr. Shiffrin at New York Criminal Defense), and Justice Peradotto noted in the decision that the Court reviewed the video and used it to rebut the People's argument that, you know, getting shocked with a taser isn't so bad in the grand scheme of things.
20 March 2012
Party host not responsible for guest's drunken crash
Martino v Stolzman, 2012 NY Slip Op 01145 [available here]
Under New York's Dram Shop Act, a bar or restaurant is responsible for injuries and mayhem caused by a drunk person if the bar or restaurant continued to serve the drunk person after the person became visibly intoxicated.* A question I get a lot is whether the Dram Shop Act also applies to social hosts who serve alcohol to their private guests.
The short answer is, no. Not unless the party host actually sells the alcohol to his or her guests, or engages in some other illegal activity (like buying and supplying alcohol to under-age drinkers).
This issue came up again recently in Martino v Stolzman, a Court of Appeals decision by way of the Fourth Department. The defendants in Martino hosted a New Year's Eve party at their home. One of their guests became intoxicated,and in the process of backing out of the defendants' driveway, collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued the hosts of the party, arguing a violation of the Dram Shop Act (for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person) and common law negligence (for failing to control the actions of a visibly intoxicated person on their property and for failing to help the intoxicated person back safely out of the driveway).
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Fourth Department that there was no violation of the Dram Shop Act, because there was no evidence that the party hosts were selling liquor. The Court of Appeals further held that the plaintiff could not prove ordinary negligence. While acknowledging that landowners have a duty to "control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to do so," the accident occurred on a public road, and the defendants "were no longer in a position to control [the drunk guy] when he entered his vehicle and drove away." (Martino, 2012 NY Slip Op 01145.)
The plaintiffs further argued that the homeowners should have stopped the drunk person from leaving their property in the first place. The Court of Appeals would not go that far, holding "requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would inappropriately expand the concept of duty." (Id.) The Court was likewise reluctant to fault the homeowners for failing to stand at the mouth of their driveway and direct the drunk guest past an alleged view obstruction. Any view obstruction was open and obvious, and a landowner is under no duty to warn of a hazard that is plain for all to see.
So, to recap: a social host may serve a guest alcohol, and is under no duty to prevent a guest from leaving the party. If the party guest is involved in an accident, the party host is not liable for damages. The responsibility for responsible drinking rests with the drinker.
* This is a bit of an oversimplification, but will do for our purposes. Also, you will not be surprised to learn that bars still sell alcohol to drunk people. It is sort of the business model.
Under New York's Dram Shop Act, a bar or restaurant is responsible for injuries and mayhem caused by a drunk person if the bar or restaurant continued to serve the drunk person after the person became visibly intoxicated.* A question I get a lot is whether the Dram Shop Act also applies to social hosts who serve alcohol to their private guests.
The short answer is, no. Not unless the party host actually sells the alcohol to his or her guests, or engages in some other illegal activity (like buying and supplying alcohol to under-age drinkers).
This issue came up again recently in Martino v Stolzman, a Court of Appeals decision by way of the Fourth Department. The defendants in Martino hosted a New Year's Eve party at their home. One of their guests became intoxicated,and in the process of backing out of the defendants' driveway, collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued the hosts of the party, arguing a violation of the Dram Shop Act (for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person) and common law negligence (for failing to control the actions of a visibly intoxicated person on their property and for failing to help the intoxicated person back safely out of the driveway).
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Fourth Department that there was no violation of the Dram Shop Act, because there was no evidence that the party hosts were selling liquor. The Court of Appeals further held that the plaintiff could not prove ordinary negligence. While acknowledging that landowners have a duty to "control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to do so," the accident occurred on a public road, and the defendants "were no longer in a position to control [the drunk guy] when he entered his vehicle and drove away." (Martino, 2012 NY Slip Op 01145.)
The plaintiffs further argued that the homeowners should have stopped the drunk person from leaving their property in the first place. The Court of Appeals would not go that far, holding "requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would inappropriately expand the concept of duty." (Id.) The Court was likewise reluctant to fault the homeowners for failing to stand at the mouth of their driveway and direct the drunk guest past an alleged view obstruction. Any view obstruction was open and obvious, and a landowner is under no duty to warn of a hazard that is plain for all to see.
So, to recap: a social host may serve a guest alcohol, and is under no duty to prevent a guest from leaving the party. If the party guest is involved in an accident, the party host is not liable for damages. The responsibility for responsible drinking rests with the drinker.
* This is a bit of an oversimplification, but will do for our purposes. Also, you will not be surprised to learn that bars still sell alcohol to drunk people. It is sort of the business model.
29 February 2012
If there is no hot pursuit, police must obtain warrant before they cuff 'em and stuff 'em*
People v Hunter, 2012 NY Slip Op 01298 [4th Dept 2012] [available here]
Back in 2006, Shawn Hunter was convicted of felony drug possession based on a undercover buy-and-bust operation in the city of Rochester. An undercover officer "purchased narcotics from defendant in front of a small apartment building," and then radioed a description of the defendant to his fellow officers. Mr. Hunter ran into the apartment building "where the pursuing officers lost sight of him." The officers set up a perimeter around the building, and "were unable to find defendant upon a search of all but one of the apartments in the building."
Instead of watching the apartment, maintaining the perimeter, and sending an officer to the courthouse for a warrant, the officers kicked in the door to Mr. Hunter's apartment and arrested him. Unfortunately for Mr. Hunter, "the buy money was recovered from defendant after he was placed in custody."
Mr. Hunter moved to suppress the buy money, arguing that the officers needed a warrant before entering his apartment.* The People argued (and the trial court agreed) that the warrantless entry was justified under the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, or failing that, that exigent circumstances justified the intrusion.
On appeal, the Fourth Department held that, while it was true that a defendant could not thwart an arrest set in motion on the street simply by successfully fleeing to a private residence, the pursuit must actually be "hot" for the exception to apply. Since there "was no immediate or continuous pursuit of [defendant] from the scene of the crime," the "hot pursuit" exception did not apply.
Likewise, the Fourth Department found that the entry could not be justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception. That exception allows the police to proceed without a warrant if the suspect presents a grave risk of harm to others, or where the suspect will likely escape if not apprehended immediately. Mr. Hunter was suspected (strongly) of selling drugs, but nothing about the crime gave the police any reason to believe that he was armed, or violent. Once the perimeter was established, there was almost no chance he could flee. The buy-and-bust happened on a "weekday afternoon," and it would have been an easy thing to obtain a warrant from a judge before entering the building. Given those facts, there was simply no emergency situation to justify foregoing the warrant and busting the door in.
The upshot of all this is that, after more than six years (all of it spent in prison, presumably), Mr. Hunter's case is sent back to County Court for further proceedings, this time with the buy money suppressed.
* Youtube failed me. This is the best I could do.
** A "warrantless intrusion" into a private residence is "presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional unless it [is] justified by one of the 'carefully delineated' exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause." I guess it did not stop the police in this case from entering every other apartment in the building before narrowing the search down to defendant's apartment, but hey. Omelettes and eggs, you know?
Back in 2006, Shawn Hunter was convicted of felony drug possession based on a undercover buy-and-bust operation in the city of Rochester. An undercover officer "purchased narcotics from defendant in front of a small apartment building," and then radioed a description of the defendant to his fellow officers. Mr. Hunter ran into the apartment building "where the pursuing officers lost sight of him." The officers set up a perimeter around the building, and "were unable to find defendant upon a search of all but one of the apartments in the building."
Instead of watching the apartment, maintaining the perimeter, and sending an officer to the courthouse for a warrant, the officers kicked in the door to Mr. Hunter's apartment and arrested him. Unfortunately for Mr. Hunter, "the buy money was recovered from defendant after he was placed in custody."
Mr. Hunter moved to suppress the buy money, arguing that the officers needed a warrant before entering his apartment.* The People argued (and the trial court agreed) that the warrantless entry was justified under the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, or failing that, that exigent circumstances justified the intrusion.
On appeal, the Fourth Department held that, while it was true that a defendant could not thwart an arrest set in motion on the street simply by successfully fleeing to a private residence, the pursuit must actually be "hot" for the exception to apply. Since there "was no immediate or continuous pursuit of [defendant] from the scene of the crime," the "hot pursuit" exception did not apply.
Likewise, the Fourth Department found that the entry could not be justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception. That exception allows the police to proceed without a warrant if the suspect presents a grave risk of harm to others, or where the suspect will likely escape if not apprehended immediately. Mr. Hunter was suspected (strongly) of selling drugs, but nothing about the crime gave the police any reason to believe that he was armed, or violent. Once the perimeter was established, there was almost no chance he could flee. The buy-and-bust happened on a "weekday afternoon," and it would have been an easy thing to obtain a warrant from a judge before entering the building. Given those facts, there was simply no emergency situation to justify foregoing the warrant and busting the door in.
The upshot of all this is that, after more than six years (all of it spent in prison, presumably), Mr. Hunter's case is sent back to County Court for further proceedings, this time with the buy money suppressed.
* Youtube failed me. This is the best I could do.
** A "warrantless intrusion" into a private residence is "presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional unless it [is] justified by one of the 'carefully delineated' exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause." I guess it did not stop the police in this case from entering every other apartment in the building before narrowing the search down to defendant's apartment, but hey. Omelettes and eggs, you know?
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